Last Friday I began to discuss In-Q-Tel and its investment in Veracode, and went a little into IQT’s investment strategy. As we said, IQT exists to determine an answer the question, ‘Is it possible to solve [problem set here]?’. If the answer is, ‘yes’, IQT’s job is to identify fiscally viable, practically capable, innovative private organizations which might be able to solve the problem at hand.
We also said that the political winds in Washington were shifting like Dick Nixon’s eyes during a bad news briefing.
Among the key problems I think IQT is now looking at is the oft-lamented fact that the US has no cogent strategy to deal with cyberwarfare, no leadership on the issue (in fact the issues surrounding this are so complex it’s hard to find anything people don’t want to talk about more. Simultaneously, political winds are blowing funds in the form of budget dollars from many places (including my wallet) towards the white tower that is the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
It is said that the CIA under George Tenet somehow recognized that private industry was surpassing government talent in the field of technological innovation. Is it possible that the CIA was prescient enough to recognize over the past few years that its budgetary influence was waning and that to re-increase its stature in the intelligence community it would need to get really geeky about cyber-warfare and get itself some really cool kit?
The CIA? Prescient? It’s become so hip to make the CIA the butt of jokes recently that people forget (this is a technological, not a political, discussion) just how much seriously cool stuff it has done.
In his 2002 review of The Bourne Identity, the New York Times’ A.O. Scott wrote that,
The movie … trots out a quaint view of the C.I.A. as not only bottomlessly malevolent, but also endlessly and terrifyingly competent. Shortly after they see Marie’s image on a security camera satellite feed, the folks at Langley are in possession of her entire life history, and they are able to track her movements across Europe with a few clicks of the mouse. This is inadvertently hilarious in light of recent news reports. If Marie had only thought to disguise herself as an international terrorist, she might never have attracted the agency’s notice in the first place.
Well, IQT itself has been a monster success. Its investments are absolutely classic examples of how to do it right: tons of due diligence, heaps of knowledgeable people asking sensible questions about the technology, the leadership of the innovative company-prospect. That they don’t make large investments (generally they’re capped at $3m) or take an equity position is a question of taste, or style, or, you know, propaganda value. But the investments are made in the form of, essentially, non-recurring engineering fees to make something wicked-cool out of something more pedestrian, and come complete with a promise to buy a bunch of it if it works out right.
But back to cyberwarfare.
If our current policies and the reality of the US’ digital security stance is any indication, policy makers would rather read tax code than infosec material – hell, even I’m reading a book on tax code, and I think this security stuff is a gas.
You take a look at something like H. R. 130, the Smarter Funding for All of America’s Homeland Security Act of 2007, whose dense prose mentions the word ‘cyber’ a total of once, and you wonder. I digress.).
We wrote in this blog back in April about Aaron Turner & Michael Assante’s excellent article in CSO Magazine, in which they compare and contrast the response in the 18th century by the United States to pirates on the high seas with today’s federal response to Internet crime. (read Turner’s prescient testimony to the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, Science and technology here).
In that blog post we also mentioned that, back in 2004 MIT Technology Review published a terrific piece by Eric Hellweg, Cyber Security’s Cassandra Syndrome which discussed the stalled and possibly addle-headed Bush administration approach to the problem of leadership of the effort to protect the nation’s computing infrastructure.
The problem, Hellweg argued, was that you couldn’t get the right people to do the job of protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure (which is basically our government’s ability to use computers and the Internet) because, well, it’s impossible. You can’t get anyone to take all the responsibility while having none of the authority to do what’s necessary. The fact of the matter is that it’s not defense against being attacked, it’s long since devolved to the point that our government should be asking itself, to paraphrase Ed Harris playing Gene Kranz in Apollo 13, ‘Whadda we got in this country’s critical infrastructure that’s good?’
More specifically, how badly are we already owned by foreign nation-states and commercial entities, and how can we look at ways to fix that? Then we can start talking about ways to have ‘Smarter Funding for All of America’s Homeland Security’.
So: IQT as savior? Are Darby and Geer (who raised some fascinating and common sense points on security metrics in his testimony before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology last year) and the infosec team at IQT the stand-in Cyber tsars by forfeit?
Well, there’s an argument for it. Geer (and Assante, by the way) sits on The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Commission on Cybersecurity for the 44th Presidency, which is working to develop recommendations for a comprehensive strategy to improve cybersecurity in federal systems and in critical infrastructure. So do a lot of other really smart people. But as several of them have admitted, the danger is that the need to reach high level consensus will lead to watered-down pablum despite the best intentions of a truly smart group of people.
It’s Washington. It’s almost inevitable. Don’t get me wrong: some great ideas will come out of the CSIS deliberations. Our biggest fear is that politics will pare down the final recommendations to be on par with ‘Don’t-click-on-attachments, wear-mittens, study-hard‘-caliber advice.
A look at the political climate in Washington, especially that surrounding the intelligence community, shows that the winds are being shifted by a Bush administration miffed at…Well, who knows.
The unclassified Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence from this past February had this to say about Cyber warfare:
The US information infrastructure — including telecommunications and computer networks and systems, and the data that reside on them — is critical to virtually every aspect of modern life. Therefore, threats to our IT infrastructure are an important focus of the Intelligence Community. As government, private sector, and personal activities continue to move to networked operations, as our digital systems add ever more capabilities, as wireless systems become even more ubiquitous, and as the design, manufacture, and service of information technology has moved overseas, our vulnerabilities will continue to grow.
In an Op-Ed piece in The Wall St Journal this past April by DNI Mike McConnell and House Intelligence Committee sub-committee chair Anna G. Eshoo, they talked about responsible domestic surveillance:
If we are going to ask our intelligence agencies to help defend our country, we need to carefully construct policies that give them access to this information when necessary, and protect the rights of Americans. The National Security Agency, for example, is governed by strict rules that protect the information of U.S. citizens. It must apply protections to all of its foreign surveillance activities, regardless of the source. As we add new authorities and programs to secure our country, we must ensure appropriate safeguards and protections to secure our liberties. We must maintain the balance between safety and freedom.
And then pooh-poohed technology…
Too often, our country has invested in dazzling new technology as the solution to our intelligence woes. Technology is vitally important. But a computer is only as good as the person who programs it. No piece of technology can substitute human judgment. A computer — even one that costs millions — cannot recruit a spy.
Meanwhile, Joe Lieberman (IND-CT) and Susan Collins (R-ME) are asking good questions that are worth reading. If you’re up for it, answers to those questions are in a letter (that inadvertently serves to highlight the marvels of redaction.
We, like you, can only speculate about what the CIA will do with Veracode’s technology, but I would be willing to bet it has something to do with finding weaknesses in code. Which is quite useful stuff, if it works. I bet there’s more where it came from, and I bet IQT will be and is looking at other infosec investments.
And with regards to Cyber warfare, we would say that, at the very least, IQT and its staffers are raising the level of discourse about the problems faced by the US – or at least by the CIA.